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Comment  Paolo Pesenti
Arguably, the interaction between interest rate stance and current account 
imbalances is nowadays—and has been for quite a while—the key interna-
tional dimension of monetary policy from the vantage point of the United 
States and its main trading partners. The point is not whether monetary 
policy can contribute signiﬁ  cantly to closing the imbalances. The relevant 
question is rather what is the most suitable monetary response to sizable 
movements in global net saving. In the recent past, when U.S. interest rates 
were raised at the moderate and predictable pace of 25 basis points every 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cycle, a hotly debated issue 
among policy analysts was whether the path for the policy rate—other 
things equal—could have been steeper or looser because of considerations 
related to trade imbalances. Today, in light of highly diﬀerentiated patterns 
of net saving in the global economy, it remains highly relevant to investigate 
whether monetary policy in the United States and abroad is appropriately 
designed to deal with the macroeconomic implications of trade imbalances.
The answers to these broad questions, and to their more nuanced variants, 
are not obvious. In fact, it is possible to articulate a number of antithetical 
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yet reasonable positions on these issues. A “dovish” take, for instance, would 
stress that, to the extent that net exports’ contribution to gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth remains in negative territory and the current account 
deﬁ  cit represents a persistent drag, a more stimulative policy action may be 
deemed as appropriate. Among other things, it would contribute to depreci-
ate the exchange rate and support foreign demand for domestic goods and 
services. The alternative “hawkish” position would point out that, as the cur-
rent account deﬁ  cit reﬂ  ects excess domestic demand, a tightening bias may 
be appropriate to preempt a build-  up of inﬂ  ationary pressures. This would 
help skewing incentives toward higher net saving by raising real rates. Then 
again, an “agnostic” view would argue that trade considerations are already 
accounted for in the central bank forecast, and there is no need to modify the 
policy path to account speciﬁ  cally for current account imbalances.
Against the backdrop of this debate, the chapter by Ferrero, Gertler, and 
Svensson (hereinafter FGS) draws a logically impeccable conclusion: “the 
current account imbalance may have implications for the natural rate of 
interest that have to factor into central bank policy, one way or another.” 
Speciﬁ  cally, “a conventional Taylor rule does not perform well in this envi-
ronment [because] it does not directly respond to the movement in the short 
term natural rate of interest rate induced by the current account imbalance. 
At zero inﬂ  ation, the rule ﬁ  xes the nominal rate at its steady-  state value. 
However, the current imbalance pushes up the short term real rate, implying 
a monetary policy that is too expansionary in this instance.”
Given the theme of this conference volume, and in the broader context of 
the current policy debate, these are important and compelling conclusions. 
It is important to understand carefully how we get there.
The chapter focuses on what I would deﬁ  ne as a transfer problem on ste-
roids. By this I mean that once we dig under the surface and the complexities 
of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)-  model apparatus, 
what we ﬁ  nd is something Keynes and Ohlin would feel very familiar with. 
The current account adjustment process is substantially seen as a large- scale 
repayment from the debtor country (the United States) to the rest of the 
world. To support the transfer of real wealth and purchasing power, what 
is needed is that resources in the United States move from the nontradables 
sector to the tradable sector, and from the import-  competing ﬁ  rms to the 
exporters. This requires changes in relative prices and the terms of trade.
The actual exercise can be summarized as follows. We know where we 
start from: a two-  country world economy in which the home country runs 
a current account deﬁ  cit in the order of 5 percent of GDP against the rest 
of the world. We know where we are going to end up: a steady state with 
zero net asset positions worldwide. To go from here to there, the authors 
suitably calibrate the dynamics of productivity and preferences and let the 
propagation mechanism of the model deliver the intertemporal details of 
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cise, global rebalancing is bound to take place even if its macroeconomic 
characteristics can diﬀer across scenarios. In other words, adjustment can be 
smooth and easy (the slow burn scenario) or it can be fast and bumpy (the 
fast burn scenario), but it is in the cards and will happen no matter what. 
Foreigners want to be repaid. The U.S. residents will do whatever it takes to 
repay them. I will return to this point in a short time. Before, let me brieﬂ  y 
comment on some of the more technical aspects of the exercise.
First, in terms of scale and detail, the FGS model occupies a somewhat 
intermediate position between the static framework of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 
(2005, 2007)—in which sectoral outputs are ﬁ  xed—and simulation exercises 
with large DSGE models, such as General Equilibrium Model (GEM).1 
With no capital, no investment, and no budget deﬁ  cits for reasons of theo-
retical parsimony, a current account improvement in FGS can be achieved 
exclusively through a contraction of consumption relative to output. In real-
ity, of course, current account dynamics are heavily aﬀected by ﬂ  uctuations 
in relative investment and ideally one would like to see the model extended 
to encompass this dimension. Nevertheless, I ﬁ  nd interesting that the main 
results of FGS substantially conﬁ  rm the ﬁ  ndings of analogous exercises 
regardless of model size and characteristics (similar half-  life for current 
account adjustment, similar cumulative size of real exchange rate adjust-
ment, etc.). Is this cross-  model similarity a sign of reliability and robust-
ness of the underlying approach? Or rather, have the building blocks of 
recent open economy macro models become so similar in substance that 
their details can hardly make any diﬀerence?
Second, there is a potential issue of country size. The United States in the 
model represents 50 percent of the world economy. As a matter of fact the 
correct ﬁ  gure is somewhere between 25 and 30 percent. In the context of a 
general- equilibrium two- country model this asymmetry in country size may 
have important quantitative implications. Then again, one could argue that 
the relevant “rest of the world” for the purpose of this analysis is, in practice, 
heavily skewed toward emerging Asia and oil exporters (with third coun-
tries such as Europe approximately balanced vis- à- vis the United States). In 
this case, the United States may actually represent more than 50 percent of 
such “world” economy. It would be straightforward to carry out sensitivity 
analysis with respect to country size, and it is worth checking whether this 
element matters or not in practice.
Third, the world economy of the model approaches over time a steady state 
with a zero net asset position worldwide (as in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [2005, 
2007] and similar stylized “transfer problem” exercises such as Corsetti, 
Martin, and Pesenti [2008]). However, the model allows for steady-  state 
growth, so that it would be possible for the home country to run a sustainable 
current account deﬁ  cit even in the steady-  state equilibrium. This of course 
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would have implications for the overall size of the real depreciation associ-
ated with adjustment: the dollar correction required to close a trend deﬁ  cit 
of 5 percent is potentially larger than the depreciation required to reduce 
the deﬁ  cit from 5 to, say, only 2 percent of GDP.
Fourth, the FGS model (and, unfortunately, most models in the litera-
ture) assumes no loss of policy credibility no matter what course of action 
the policymakers take. Inﬂ  ation converges to target at a relatively fast pace, 
and bygones are bygones. This may be especially relevant for the fast-  burn 
scenario. The appropriate model- based monetary stance implies some short- 
term tolerance for higher consumer price index (CPI) inﬂ  ation, which in 
“real-  life” situations could be misperceived by markets as a sign that poli-
cymakers are dangerously falling behind the curve. As a result, inﬂ  ation 
expectations may persistently deviate from the policy target if agents become 
concerned with the inability of the monetary authority to achieve price 
stability. By ignoring credibility issues tout- court, the model’s potential for 
realistic policy evaluation ends up being severely curtailed.
Finally, the model abstracts from valuation eﬀects (capital gains and 
losses related to exchange rate movements when gross assets and liabilities 
are denominated in diﬀerent currencies), thus ignoring a potentially crucial 
aspect of the adjustment process.
Moving to the message of the chapter, there are two important lessons 
that require some discussion. First, domestic price (producer price index 
[PPI]) targeting turns out to be a better policy strategy than CPI targeting. 
Second, as far as the behavior of foreign authorities is concerned, a regime 
of limited exchange rate ﬂ  exibility abroad turns out to be an inferior mon-
etary strategy: in a nutshell, better dead than peg. Let’s analyze these two 
results in some detail.
As the authors write, “within our framework, a domestic inﬂ  ation target 
may be preferable to consumer price inﬂ  ation target.” Why? One could use a 
core inﬂ  ation targeting argument here (a good starting point for any analysis 
of optimal monetary policy in closed and/or open economies). To make a 
long story short, optimal policies are expected to stabilize a weighted aver-
age of markups in labor and product markets, where the weights assigned 
to the diﬀerent markups reﬂ  ect to some extent the degree of nominal inertia 
associated with the underlying prices. In other words, the appropriate mon-
etary stance pays more attention to sectors with more persistent nominal 
distortions, while it does not react to changes in sectors where adjustment 
is driven by ﬂ  exible prices.
Now, if import prices are suﬃciently ﬂ  exible while domestic prices are 
sticky, it makes sense to target a basket of domestic prices only. In the con-
text of the model (until section 4.5) PPI targeting is more appropriate than 
CPI targeting. This is because the law of one price holds and exchange rate 
pass-  through is high, making import prices relatively close to the ﬂ  exible 
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The problem of course is that exchange rate pass-  through is high in the 
model by assumption, not because it matches a stylized fact. In reality, pass- 
through to U.S. import prices is relatively low, even at the border level. 
Because of extensive invoicing of world exports in dollars, import prices 
in the United States have low sensitivity to exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations. In 
a (realistic) “dollar pricing” world, terms of trade and import prices move 
much less than conventional wisdom would suggest in response to exchange 
rate ﬂ  uctuations.
Some sensitivity analysis on this point is presented in section 4.5, and 
these new results provide a more reliable guideline for policy evaluation. In 
short, PPI targeting remains reasonably eﬀective but CPI targeting yields 
substantially similar outcomes. In the future, it would be interesting to bring 
this analysis to the next step and provide a full account of optimal monetary 
policy according to the model, instead of restricting the analysis to the com-
parison between “simple” targeting rules.
Let us consider now the appropriate monetary behavior of the rest of the 
world. As the authors write, “by not letting its nominal exchange rate appre-
ciate, the foreign country encourages excess demand in its tradable sector 
which spills over to its nontradable sector. The end product is rapid domestic 
inﬂ  ation, which provides the source of the exchange rate depreciation and 
the current-  account adjustment. In addition to the current account and the 
real exchange rate, the home country economy is also not much aﬀected 
by the foreign-  country peg. Indeed, it is the foreign country economy that 
largely bears the brunt.”
Recall: the rest of the world pegs its nominal exchange rate to the home 
currency, but adjustment through the real exchange rate occurs no matter 
what. Because the rest of the world is unable or unwilling to prevent adjust-
ment, the choice of the peg simply means that all the action goes through 
inﬂ  ation diﬀerentials.2
As a feature of the process of global adjustment, these results are insight-
ful and absolutely right. But they may overlook a few important elements 
that have contributed to the unfolding of global imbalances in the ﬁ  rst place.
To make my point as simply as possible, think of a government in the rest 
of the world that is willing to accumulate oﬃcial reserves for unexplained 
or extra-  economic reasons (for instance, in order to maintain comfortable 
exchange rate levels for its exporters, protect market shares in the home 
market, and absorb excess labor force in the tradable sector as considered 
by the advocates of the so-  called “Bretton Woods II” view3). Also assume 
that such a government is very successful at sterilizing its foreign exchange 
intervention. It is irrelevant to observe that this behavior may be subopti-
mal. Everything we need to know is simply that some agents somewhere in 
2. Similar considerations hold in the case of GEM simulations. See Faruqee et al. (2007).
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the world economy are willing to support persistent capital inﬂ  ows to the 
United States.
Under this scenario, the logic of the transfer problem is no longer valid. 
The rest of the world does not want to be repaid (at least for now). Its ﬁ  xed 
exchange rate regime is not just a bad policy choice given the dynamics of 
adjustment. It is a policy that changes the dynamics of adjustment itself, and 
substantially prevents the rebalancing from taking place.
An analysis of the implications of this behavior requires a drastically 
diﬀerent kind of simulation exercise, one in which the rest of the world is 
assumed to take the other side of the transaction and persistently provide 
the home country with the funds needed to ﬁ  nance its trade deﬁ  cit. From the 
vantage point of the United States the policy implications can be severely 
diﬀerent relative to the aforementioned ones, in fact diﬀerent enough to 
reopen the question of whether the natural rate in the United States must 
actually increase if the rest of the world pegs its currency to the dollar.
Moving beyond academic speculation, concerns of this kind have been 
expressed in recent years by several policymakers. It seems appropriate to 
close with the following representative quote (my italics):
“Insuﬃciently ﬂ  exible exchange rate regimes have the potential to alter 
the pattern of capital ﬂ  ows and the price of ﬁ  nancial assets [ . . . ] The fact 
that oﬃcial purchases of ﬁ  nancial assets are determined by diﬀerent factors 
than those inﬂ  uencing private investors suggests that we would probably 
see a somewhat diﬀerent combination of capital ﬂ  ows, exchange rates and 
interest rates in the absence of oﬃcial intervention. To the extent that the 
factors aﬀecting capital ﬂ  ows act to raise asset prices, lower interest rates 
and reduce risk premiums, it is harder for the markets to assess how much 
of the currently very favorable conditions are likely to reﬂ  ect fundamentals 
and prove more durable. If the prevailing patterns of capital ﬂ  ows were to 
exert downward pressure on interest rates and upward pressure on other asset 
prices, they would contribute to more expansionary ﬁ  nancial conditions than 
would otherwise be the case. Among other things, this outcome complicates 
our ability to assess the present stance of monetary policy. It can change how 
monetary policy aﬀects overall ﬁ  nancial conditions and the economy as a 
whole” (Geithner 2006).
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